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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE ESTATE OF DOUGLAS B. COVINGTON,
by and through its Co-Personal
Representatives, Robert H.
Covington and Mary C. Whetman,

]
]

Plaintiffs and Appellees,
vs.
)
JOHN C. JOSEPHSON and GERALDINE C.
JOSEPHSON,

])

Case No. 930371CA
Priority

(15)

Defendants and Appellants. ;

JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to
the provisions of Section 78-2a-3 (2) (d) , Utah Code Annotated, and
Rule 3 ( a ) , Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ISSUES
ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW:
ISSUE I.

Did an adjudication in a prior action (District

Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, Civil No. C-89-339, between the
identical parties to the present action and

involving

the

same

Uniform Real Estate Contract) that said contract was paid in full
by defendants to the plaintiffs bar

(under the doctrines of res

judicata or collateral estoppel or otherwise) any further recovery
on said contract by the plaintiffs from the defendants for property
taxes and water assessment, which, if they were owing at all, were
due and owing at the time of entry of the prior Judgment?

STANDARD OF REVIEW: A grant of summary judgment is only
proper if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

In determining

whether there is no genuine issue of material fact, all facts and
inferences therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to
the party

(in this case the defendants) against whom summary

judgment is granted.

In deciding if the trial court properly

granted judgment as a matter of law, the appellate court gives no
deference to the trial court7s view of the law, and will fully
review the same for correctness. Utah State Coal, of Sr. Citizens
v. U P & L. 776 P2d 632 (Utah 1989). The appellate court will also
give no deference to the lower court7s legal conclusions concerning
whether material facts are in dispute. Wvcalis v. Guardian Title,
780 P2d 821, 825 (Utah App. 1989).
Issue II. Is the Judgment of the District Court subject
to collateral attack in the Circuit Court?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:
ISSUE

III.

Was

The same as for Issue I above.
the Uniform

Real

Estate

Contract

terminated by payment in full so as to be no longer available to
support a claim for taxes, water assessment, attorney fees or
interest?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:
ISSUE IV.

The same as for Issue I above.

Were issues of material facts raised as to:

(A) Was the issue of payment of taxes and water

-2-

assessments excluded as an issue from the trial of the District
Court case?
(B) Were the attorney fees reasonable, and can the
court make that determination on affidavit without a hearing and
without a supporting finding of fact?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:
ISSUE V.

The same as for Issue I above.

Did the court err in denying defendants7 Motion

for Summary Judgment?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The same as for Issue I above,

except that all facts and inferences therefrom should be viewed in
the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, against whom such
Motion for Summary Judgment was sought.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES.
RULES AND REGULATIONS WHERE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE
Not applicable.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE.

The plaintiffs brought this action

in the lower court in July 1992 seeking judgment for real property
taxes, water assessment and attorney7s fees pursuant to a Uniform
Real Estate Contract. (R. 1)

The defendants denied owing the

plaintiffs any such sums and asserted that the plaintiffs7 claims
were barred by the doctrine of res judicata and collateral estoppel
by virtue of a final adjudication in the District Court of Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, between the same parties on December
18, 1991, in Case No. C-89-3339. (R. 12)
-3-

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS,

Both parties filed Motions for

Summary Judgment (R. 37, 39) , which were served and filed together
with supporting memoranda (R. 15, 41, 77) and affidavits (R. 47, 63
and 72), which were duly argued to the court.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT.

The court granted the

plaintiffs7 Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 102) for the sum of
$3,370.70,

together

with

costs

of

$141.40,

plus

$3,127.50

attorney's fees, plus interest on the sum of $3,440.70 at the
"contract rate of 3/4's of one percent per month from May 8, 1992,
until date hereof" on the Judgment and thereafter 12% per annum
until paid.

The court denied defendants7 Motion for Summary

Judgment. (R. 102)

Timely Motion to Alter and Amend Judgment (R.

115) served and filed by defendants was denied, and this appeal was
thereupon taken. (R. 117)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

On or about May 4, 1973, plaintiffs7 predecessors,

Douglas B. Covington, and his wife, Alice H. Covington, as Sellers,
sold to the defendants, pursuant to a Uniform Real Estate Contract,
a tract of land in Salt Lake County consisting of approximately 2.5
acres, together with five shares of irrigation company water stock.
(R. 30)
B.

As a part of the same transaction, Douglas B.

Covington and defendant, John C. Josephson, entered into a written
Addendum to the said Uniform Real Estate Contract, whereby the
Uniform Real Estate Contract was amended to provide for a right-of-4-

way to the property being purchased by the Josephsons across a
tract being retained by Douglas Covington and his wife. (R. 25, 51)
C.

The

Josephsons

paid

on

that

Contract

for

approximately fifteen years. During that time Mrs. Covington died
(in 1981) and her interest passed to her husband, Douglas B.
Covington, as they held the property as joint tenants, and in 1987
Mr. Covington also died and was succeeded in ownership of the
property by the plaintiffs. (R. 25, 51)
D.

After the property was paid off and the time had

come to convey the property to the Josephsons, the plaintiffs
refused to convey the right-of-way and asserted that the Josephsons
had no right-of-way. The Josephsons (defendants) refused to accept
that position, recorded a Notice of Interest asserting their right
to the right-of-way and continued to use the right-of-way as they
had for some fifteen or more years before. (R. 25, 51)
E.

In about May of 1989 plaintiffs in the present

action commenced a suit against the Josephsons (defendants in this
action and in the prior action) in the District Court of Salt Lake
County,

Utah,

Case

No.

C-89-3339,

seeking

a

quiet

title

determination that the property which the Covingtons had retained
was not subject to a right-of-way, for damages for slander of title
against the Josephsons
Interest,

for

trespass

(defendants) for filing the Notice of
on

the

grounds

that

the

Josephsons

(defendants) continued to use the old right-of-way without the
right to do so, and for an injunction restraining the Josephsons
-5-

(defendants)

from

continuing

to use

the

right-of-way.

The

Josephsons (defendants) counterclaimed in that action against the
plaintiffs asking the court therein to quiet title in them to a
nonexclusive right-of-way across the property retained by the
Covingtons leading from Danish Road to the north side of their
property, together with five shares of water stock, together with
the determination that the Uniform Real Estate Contract was "fully
paid and performed by defendants, and defendants are entitled to
conveyance"

of

the

property.

The

defendants

also

sought

determination that plaintiffs' refusal to convey the right-of-way
was without merit and that they were entitled to attorney's fees
under 78-27-56, Utah Code Annotated.

The Josephsons (defendants)

also sought attorney's fees based upon the attorney's fee provision
in the Uniform Real Estate Contract, and Josephsons (defendants)
also sought damages for plaintiffs' unlawful attempt to obstruct
the right-of-way.

(As noted, the plaintiffs and the defendants in

Case No. C-89-3339

were identical to the plaintiffs and the

defendants in the present action, and both actions involved the
same Uniform Real Estate Contract. (R. 25, 51, 30, 47)
F.

In the District Court action the plaintiffs filed a

Reply to the Counterclaim, in which plaintiffs "deny that the
defendants have performed said obligations" under the Uniform Real
Estate Contract, admitted that, upon full performance, defendants
would be entitled to a conveyance under the Uniform Real Estate
Contract of the 2.5 acres which they purchased, but without the
-6-

right-of-way, and otherwise generally denied the allegations of the
Counterclaim and asserted, by way of affirmative defenses, statutes
of frauds, unclean hands, lack of consideration and statute of
limitations. (R. 47)
G.

The District Court case was tried to the court

without a jury, Honorable Richard H. Moffat presiding, in June
1991, and Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment were
ultimately entered on December 18, 1991, quieting title in the
Josephsons to the 2.5 acres and awarding them the claimed right-ofway and $4,000 attorney fees. (R. 25, 51) Also, in paragraph 6 of
the said Findings of Fact in said prior District Court case, the
court found that the said Uniform Real Estate Contract has been
"paid in full." (R. 54)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I.

THE PLAINTIFFS' ACTION IS BARRED BY THE

DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA OR COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL.
In the current action commenced in the Circuit Court of
Salt Lake County plaintiffs seek a judgment for arrears of taxes
and water assessment plus attorney,s fees based on a Uniform Real
Estate Contract.

The said Uniform Real Estate Contract was the

subject to prior litigation between the same parties in the
District Court of Salt Lake County, and in that action the court
made a finding that the said Uniform Real Estate Contract was "paid
in full."

Both cases dealt with the issue of payment of the

Uniform Real Estate Contract, both cases involved the same parties
-7-

and therefore, under the doctrine of res judicata and collateral
estoppel, the Circuit Court action is barred.
POINT II.

THE JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT IS NOT

SUBJECT TO COLLATERAL ATTACK IN THE CIRCUIT COURT.
The plaintiffs are attempting in the present Circuit
Court action to collaterally attack the Findings and Judgment in
the prior District Court action, wherein the court found that the
Uniform Real Estate Contract was "paid in full."

The Judgment of

the District Court is only subject to review on appeal or by direct
attack under Rule 60(b).

The Judgment is clear, complete and

unambiguous on its face and is certainly not subject to collateral
attack in an inferior court.
POINT III. THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT, HAVING BEEN
FOUND TO HAVE BEEN PAID IN FULL BY THE DISTRICT COURT, IS
TERMINATED AND NO LONGER AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT A CLAIM FOR TAXES,
WATER ASSESSMENT OR ATTORNEY'S FEES.
Where the District Court found in the First Case that the
defendants had fully performed and that the Uniform Real Estate
Contract was "paid in full," the contract is terminated, and there
is no further obligation of the defendants which they could
possibly breach and which could possibly be the subject of a
subsequent cause of action relating to payment of that same
contract.
POINT IV.

AT THE VERY LEAST, FACTUAL ISSUES EXIST AS

RAISED BY THE AFFIDAVITS OF THE PARTIES.
-8-

At the very least, the Affidavit of John C. Josephson
raised issues of fact, to-wit, whether the Uniform Real Estate
Contract was paid in full; whether or not there was any reservation
of issues in the First Case; as to the reasonableness of attorney's
fees; and as to whether they can be awarded on affidavit; these
issues of fact preclude summary judgment.
POINT

V.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANTS'

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
If the plaintiffs' action is barred by res judicata,
collateral estoppel, impropriety of collateral attack, or upon the
allegation that the Uniform Real Estate Contract was fully paid and
thus terminated, then defendants were entitled to summary judgment,
and the court erred in denying defendants summary judgment.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE PLAINTIFFS' ACTION IS BARRED BY THE

DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA OR COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL.
The Supreme Court of Utah in the case of Schaer v. State
bv & Through Dept. of Transportation, 657 P2d 1337 (Utah 1983), set
forth at page 1340 the rules governing the law applicable to res
judicata and collateral estoppel as follows:
"There are certain distinctions to be made in the
application of the doctrines of res judicata and
collateral estoppel.
In order to determine which
doctrine is to be properly applied, one must focus on
whether the second claim, demand, or cause of action is
different from that of the first:
fl/

In order for res judicata to apply, both suits
must involve the same parties or their privies and also
-9-

the same cause of action; and this precludes the
relitigation of all issues that could have been litigated
as well as those that were, in fact, litigated in the
prior action . . . ,
fl/

Collateral estoppel, on the other hand, arises
from a different cause of action and prevents parties or
their privies from relitigating facts and issues in the
second suit that were fully litigated in the first
suit.'"
In said citation the court is quoting from Searle Bros.
v. Searle, 588 P2d 689 (Utah 1978).
The elements of res judicata are thus defined to be:
1.

The same parties (or privies);

2.

The second claim, demand or cause of action is the

same as the first;
3.

Issues that could have been litigated are barred as

well as those that were in fact litigated in the prior action.
The elements of collateral estoppel are:
1.

The same parties (or privies);

2.

Different causes of action;

3.

Facts and issues litigated in the first suit cannot

be relitigated in the second.
Res judicata clearly appears to be a bar in this case,
and we will analyze the present Circuit Court action ("Second
Case") and the prior District Court action of "The Estate of
Douglas

B.

Covington,

Representatives,

Robert

by
H.

and

through

Covington

and

its
Mary

Co-Personal
C.

Whetman,

Plaintiffs, vs. John C. Josephson and Geraldine C. Josephson,
-10-

Defendants," Case No. 89-3339 ("First Case11) , item by item:
1.

The same parties (or privies):

The parties in both cases are identical with no deviation
whatsoever;
2.

The same cause of action:

In the First Case, defendants asked in their Counterclaim
that the Uniform Real Estate Contract be declared paid in full, and
plaintiffs denied that it was paid in full. The court found in the
First Case that the Uniform Real Estate Contract was "paid in
full."

In the Second Case plaintiffs claim that taxes and water

assessments were still owing under that contract and that therefore
the Uniform Real Estate Contract was not paid in full.
3. Issues that could have been litigated or that were in
fact litigated are barred.
The issue of whether the Uniform Real Estate Contract was
paid in full was tried in the First Case and the court found in
Finding of Fact No. 6 that the Uniform Real Estate Contract was
"paid in full."

But even if that were not so, the taxes and water

assessments claimed in the Second Case were for the years 1989,
1990 and 1991 and therefore could have been litigated and included
in the Judgment entered in the First Case in December of 1991.
Even if res judicata did not apply, under the collateral
estoppel doctrine:
1.

The parties are the same.

2.

The fact or issue of payment of the Uniform Real
-11-

Estate Contract was tried in the First Case and a finding of
payment in full duly entered.
Had there been any sum owing to plaintiffs for principal,
interest, insurance, taxes assessment or otherwise, the plaintiffs
were not obliged to convey anything to the defendants.

The court

specifically found that nothing further was owing and quieted title
to the subject property and the right-of-way in the defendants.
Therefore, under either doctrine, it is clear that the
issue of payment of the Uniform Real Estate Contract was tried and
determined in the First Case and is barred in the Second Case.
POINT II.

THE JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT IS NOT

SUBJECT TO COLLATERAL ATTACK IN THE CIRCUIT COURT.
As noted in Point I, the undisputed facts compel the
conclusion that the Judgment in the First Case is a bar to the
Second Case. The plaintiffs attempt to circumvent the foregoing by
apparently claiming that the Findings and Judgment entered in the
First Case don't mean what they say, asserting that it was not
intended that the District Court Findings and Judgment include the
payment of taxes and water assessment, notwithstanding the language
employed in the Findings clearly and unequivocally state that the
Uniform Real Estate Contract was "paid in full."

As noted above,

had there been any sum owing to the plaintiffs for any reason,
whether principal, interest, insurance, taxes or assessment, the
defendants would not have been entitled to judgment quieting title
in them to the subject property and right-of-way, and the court
-12-

would have declined to quiet the title in defendants, and certainly
would not have made a finding that the contract was "paid in full."
The payment of taxes and water assessments is as much a
responsibility of the buyer under a uniform real estate contract as
is the payment of principal and interest, and the buyer is not
entitled to conveyance of the property until all sums owing have
been paid in full.
The plaintiffs' attempt to obtain a judgment for taxes
and water assessment in the Second Case in the Circuit Court is a
collateral attack upon the decree of the District Court in the
First Case and is not proper. The plaintiffs attempt by affidavit
to assert that the issue of payment of taxes and water assessment
was excluded

from the District Court Judgment.

Neither the

Findings nor the Judgment in the First Case, however, contains any
such reservation, but to the contrary purport to be a total and
complete adjudication of all issues existing between the parties.
The defendants categorically deny that there was any such
reservation of said issue, and defendant, John C. Josephson,
unequivocally states in his Affidavit (R. 47) as follows:
"2. That I fully performed my duties under the
Uniform Real Estate Contract referred to in Plaintiffs'
Complaint, making the final payment May 18, 1989 . . .
"4. . . . I further state that my Answer filed in
that action alleged full performance of the contract by
me, and Plaintiffs7 Reply denied such performance, and
that issue was directly tried by the District Court,
giving rise to the above-quoted Finding."
If it is the plaintiffs' position that the Findings and
-13-

Judgment in the District Court case were in any way in error, then
plaintiffs sole remedy was appeal, or a direct attack upon the
Judgment

under

Rule

Certainly

the

Circuit

60(b),
Court

Utah

Rules

is not

of

Civil

entitled

to

Procedure.
ignore

the

unambiguous Judgment of a superior court or entertain any kind of
a collateral attack upon it.
In 46 Am Jur 2nd, Judgments, Section 621, it states in
relevant part:
"The general rule is that a judgment is not subject
to collateral attack where the court had jurisdiction of
the subject matter and of the parties or, in proceedings
in rem, of the res."
There is no dispute in this action that the District
Court had jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter.
The Findings and Judgment are complete and unambiguous, and as
stated in the Utah case of Erickson v. McCoullough, 91 Ut 159, 63
P2d 595 (1937), at page 599:
"The probate court having acquired jurisdiction of
a cause, its orders and judgments are presumed to be
based upon evidence, stipulations or proceedings
sufficient to support such orders or judgments."
and goes on to point out that any objection is "'available only on
direct application to the same court, or on appeal.,n (quoting from
Section 102-1-8 R.S. Utah 1933.)

The same is true in this case.

Furthermore, the Judgment of the District Court in the
First Case is clear and unambiguous when it declares the contract
paid in full and quiets title to the subject property and right-ofway in the defendants, which it could not legally have done if any
-14-

sum was found to be owing.

Therefore, although a judgment, like

any other instrument, may be subject to parol evidence if it is
ambiguous upon its face, the District Court Judgment in this action
is not ambiguous on its face and is not subject to the introduction
of parol evidence to attempt to explain it.
Accordingly, plaintiffs are precluded from attempting to
vary the clear meaning of the Findings and Judgment by attempting
to introduce any alleged collateral agreements or understandings
between the parties as to the scope of the Judgment, It is stated
at 46 Am Jur 2d, Judgments, Section 72:
"If, on the other hand, the judgment is not
ambiguous or uncertain, the parol evidence rule applies,
and the written judgment should be accepted at its face
value and without speculating as to the reasoning
employed in reaching the particular result."
POINT III. THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT, HAVING BEEN
FOUND TO HAVE BEEN PAID IN FULL BY THE DISTRICT COURT, IS
TERMINATED AND NO LONGER AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT A CLAIM FOR TAXES,
WATER ASSESSMENT OR ATTORNEY'S FEES.
The District Court found that the Uniform Real Estate
Contract was "paid in full," which means that the defendants have
fully performed all of their obligations under the contract, and
they cannot now be found to be deficient so as to support a claim
for taxes, water assessments, interest or attorney's fees.

If the

contract has been paid in full, there is nothing further in the
contract to be breached by the defendants.

-15-

It is axiomatic that where a contract has been paid in
full, there can be no breach thereof as to payment.

Or viewed

another way, once the contract has been paid, it is terminated and
discharged.

In 17A Am Jur 2d, Section 539, it states:

"A contract may be discharged by performance in
accordance with its terms, and this is the normal
termination of every contract."
By analogy, where a contract has been rescinded, there can be
no award of attorney7 fees based thereon.

BLT Investment Company

v. Snow. 586 P2d 456 (Utah 1978).
POINT IV.

AT THE VERY LEAST, FACTUAL ISSUES EXIST AS

RAISED BY THE AFFIDAVITS OF THE PARTIES.
Even if the defendants are in error on the points
previously asserted herein, at the very least the Affidavit of
defendant, John C. Josephson raises factual issues which would have
to be tried by the court.

As noted above, the defendant, John

Josephson, clearly states in his Affidavit:
"2.
That I fully performed my duties under the
Uniform Real Estate Contract referred to in Plaintiffs7
Complaint, making the final payment May 18, 1989 . . .
"4. . . . I further state that my Answer filed in
that action alleged full performance of the contract by
me, and Plaintiffs' Reply denied such performance, and
that issue was directly tried by the District Court,
giving rise to the above-quoted Finding."
It is clear that the defendants in their Answer in the
present case deny any liability to the plaintiffs, (R. 12) thus
presenting an issue for trial.

Plaintiffs7 Motion for Summary

Judgment was not supported by affidavits when served and filed
-16-

herein. Therefore no counteraffidavit was required by defendants.
Nevertheless, the defendants served and filed an Affidavit by
defendant, John C. Josephson (R. 47), asserting that the contract
was paid in full and asserting that the issue of full performance
was tried by the court.

Only thereafter did plaintiffs serve and

file the Affidavit of plaintiff, Mary C.Whetman, and the Affidavit
of plaintiffs' attorney, David K. Broadbent. (R. 63, 72)

These

affidavits do no more that oppose the Affidavit of defendant, John
C. Josephson, and at most create fact issues which preclude summary
judgment in favor of defendants.

Plaintiffs' Affidavits were

served one day before the oral argument and are clearly untimely
for any purpose other that in opposition to defendant's Affidavit.
Furthermore, as noted above, in determining whether
there is a genuine issue of material fact, all facts and inferences
therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party
(in this case the defendants) against whom summary judgment is
granted.

Utah State Coal, of Sr. Citizens v. U P & L, supra. On

appeal, no deference shall be given to the lower court's legal
conclusions concerning whether material facts are in dispute.
Wycalis v. Guardian Title, supra.
The plaintiffs refer to a letter (R. 87) by Robert C.
Cummings, counsel for defendants in the First Case, in which Mr.
Cummings at most acknowledges that he received certain tax notices
from plaintiffs' attorney and that he would take them up with his
clients when his clients returned from an out-of-town trip.
-17-

The

plaintiffs attempt to convert that simple letter into an admission
made on behalf of the defendants that they owed the taxes.

By no

stretch of the imagination can that letter be so construed.

Even

if the letter contained a "promise" made on behalf of defendants to
pay the taxes, there is no consideration to support it. But in any
event it cannot be said to do more than raise an issue of fact.
It should be noted that the plaintiffs have not stated a
cause of action for quantum meruit, and even if, under some version
of the facts, the plaintiffs were able to assert an equitable right
to reimbursement to any part of the claimed taxes or assessment,
the plaintiffs would be required to amend and assert such a claim,
and defendants are entitled to a trial on that issue.

It is

certainly not the proper subject for summary judgment, and of
course it should be noted that even if the plaintiffs were able to
assert a claim in quantum meruit, they would not be entitled to
attorney's fees or interest under the Uniform Real Estate Contract.
Finally, the court awarded attorney's fees based only on an
affidavit, without an evidentiary hearing and without a finding of
fact.

There remains therefore an issue of the reasonableness of

the attorney's fees.

Our Supreme Court has held that attorney's

fees may not be awarded in the absence of a hearing and a finding
of fact unless the parties stipulate otherwise.

See the case of

Provo City Corporation v. Cropper. 28 Ut 2d 1, 497 P2d 629 (1972) :
" . . . unless the parties agree otherwise, the
court is obliged to take evidence on the issue of the
-18-

reasonableness of the attorney's
findings thereon."
POINT

V.

fees

and

to make

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANTS'

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
If the defendants are correct in their arguments made in
Points I, II and III above, or any of them, then summary judgment
should have been granted in the defendants' favor and against
plaintiffs on the grounds of res judicata, or collateral estoppel,
or the impropriety of a collateral attack in the Circuit Court upon
the District Court Judgment, or that the Uniform Real Estate
Contract has been fully performed and is terminated, and defendants
are entitled to summary judgment.

The defendants believe that

Points I and II are correct and controlling and that summary
judgment should therefore have been awarded to them.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Summary Judgment of the
Circuit Court in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants
must be reversed, and defendants' Summary Judgment against the
plaintiffs should be granted or, at the very least, the matter
should be remanded for trial in the Circuit Court on the issues
of fact referred to above.

GORDON A. MADSEN
Attorney for the Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
A copy of the foregoing Appellants' Brief was mailed to
David

K.

Broadbent

and Thomas M. Melton, attorneys

for the

plaintiffs and appellees, at their address, City Centre I, Suite
900, 175 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah, postage prepaid,
this

day of December, 1993.

Attorney for the Defendants
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PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
David K. Broadbent (0442)
Thomas M. Melton (4999)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 524-1000
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

THE ESTATE OF DOUGLAS B.
COVINGTON, by and through its
Co-Personal Representatives,
Robert H. Covington and
Mary C. Whetman,

COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
Civil No.
JOHN C. AND GERALDINE C.
JOSEPHSON,
Judge
Defendants.

PwP—

The plaintiffs, Robert H. Covington and Mary C. Whetman,
the co-personal representatives of the Estate of Douglas B.
Covington, complain and allege against defendants as follows:
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.

Jurisdiction is appropriate in this court pursuant

to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4.
2.

Venue is proper in this court pursuant to Utah Code

Ann. §§ 78-13-1 and 78-13-4.

si
C

PARTIES
3.

Plaintiffs Robert H. Covington and Mary C. Whetman

(collectively the "Covingtons") are Personal Representatives for
the Estate of Douglas B. Covington.
4.

Defendants John C. and Geraldine C. Josephson

(collectively the "Josephsons") are husband and wife and are
residents of Salt Lake County.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
5.

On or about May 4, 1973 Douglas B. and Alice H.

Covington (the "Covingtons") entered into a Uniform Real Estate
Contract (the "Contract").

A copy of the Contract is attached

hereto as Exhibit "A".
6.

Under the terms of the Contract, the Covingtons

agreed to sell and the Josephsons agreed to buy the property
described as follows:
BEG. at a point N 89°54,10" W 1320 ft fr the
SE cor of Sec 35, T2S, R1E, SLB&M, and running
th N 0°10f23l W 505.475 ft to a point on an
old barbed wire fenceline; thence N 86°34l10"
W 265.41 ft; th S 20°15' E 555.567 ft to the S
line of said Sec 35, th along said S line S
89°54,10" E 74.17 ft to point of beg.
7.

The contract also provides for the payment of taxes

and assessments on the property as follows:
11. The Buyer agrees to pay all taxes and
assessments of every kind and nature which are
or which may be assessed and which may become
due on these premises during the life of this
agreement.
E. YEATES
DZAHLEA
• i, suit* 900 ;
f
ourth South
Ak« City
»84111
524-1000

12. The Buyer agrees to pay the general taxes
after May 4, 1973.
-2-

8.

The Worthingtons have failed to pay, and continue

to refuse to pay the outstanding taxes and assessments upon the
Property, including taxes in the amount of $3,377.15, water share
assessments in the amount of $63.55 and other sums due and owing
under the terms of the Contract.

Under the terms of the

Contract, the Covingtons have paid these outstanding amounts,
together with interest.

The Covingtons are entitled to be

reimbursed for these sums paid on behalf of the Worthingtons.
9.

On or about June 5, 1992, the Covingtons informed

the Worthingtons in writing of the payment of taxes and
assessments.

The letter demanded that the Worthingtons repay the

Covingtons for the unpaid taxes and assessments.

A true and

correct copy of the letter is attached hereto as Exhibit "3".
10.

Alice C. Covington died on December 17, 1981, and

upon her death, all of her interest passed to Douglas B.
Covington.

Douglas B. Covington died on September 27, 1987.

Plaintiffs are the personal representatives of the Estate of
Douglas B. Covington.
11.

The Contract further provides that in the event

either party to the Contract defaults in any of its covenants or
agreements, the defaulting party shall pay all costs, expenses
and attorneys' fees which arise or accrue from enforcing the
Contract.

Contract, 1F 21.
CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Breach of Contract)

:E, YEATES
LDZAHlEft
tr« I, Suit* 900
t Fourth South
U k « City
ih 84111
) 524-1000

12.

Paragraphs 1 through 11 above are incorporated
-3-

herein as though fully set forth.
13.

The Covingtons have performed each of their

obligations under the Contract and each condition precedent to
the entitlement of plaintiffs to the relief sought in this Count
has been performed or has occurred.
14.

The Worthingtons have failed and refused and

continue to fail and refuse to pay the outstanding taxes and
assessments on the Property though required to do so under the
terms of the Contract.
15.

The Worthingtons' actions amount to a breach of the

Contract and the Worthingtons are therefore liable to the
Convingtons for an amount equal to the unpaid taxes and
assessments, plus interest at the amount set forth in the
Contract accruing through the date of the Covington's receipt of
such amount and all costs, expenses and attorneys' fees incurred
by the Covingtons in their attempts to enforce the Contract.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs demand judgment against defendants
as follows:
1.

For judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against

defendants in an amount equal to the taxes and assessments paid
by the plaintiffs on behalf of the defendants, together with all
interst accruing through the date of payment of such amounts,
expenses and attorney's fees incurred by plaintiffs in their
efforts to mitigate their damages and enforce the Contract.

-4-

2.

For such other and further relief as the court deems
u

appropriate.
DATED this

2

day of July, 1992.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

David K. Broadbent
Thomas M. Melton
Attdrniys for Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs' Address:
941 Statice Avenue
Sandy, UT 84070
4898F

:C YEATES j
LDZAHLER
\r% I, Suite 900
t Fourth South
U k « City
•h 84111
) 524-1000
ii
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GORDON A. MADSEN, No. 2043
Attorney for the Defendants
West Center Street
North Salt Lake, Utah 84054
Telephone 298-6610
6F
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAi<F CITY DEPARTMENT
THE ESTATE OF DOUGLAS B.,
COVINGTON, by and through its
Co-Personal Representatives,
Robert H. Covington and
Mary C. Wheaton,
ANSWER
Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. 920009436CV

JOHN C. and GERALDINE C.
JOSEPHSON,

Judge Robin W. Reese

Defendants.
Come now the defendants and answer plaintiffs1 Complaint
as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
1.

Said Complaint fails to state a claim against

defendants upon which relief can be granted.
SECOND DEFENSE
2.

Admit the allegations of paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4,

except deny that a copy of said contract was attached to said
Complaint.
3.

Admit the allegations of paragraphs 5, 6 and 7.

4.

Deny the allegations of paragraphs 8 and 9.

5.

Admit the allegations of paragraph 10.

6.

Deny the allegations of paragraphs 11, 12, 13, 14

and 15, except allege that the Uniform Real Estate Contract speaks
for itself.
7.

Deny each and every other allegation of said

Complaint not hereinabove specifically admitted.
THIRD DEFENSE
8.

Plaintiffs1 Complaint is barred by the principles

of res judicata and collateral estoppel, and the Final Judgment in
the case of "The Estate of Douglas B. Covington, by and through
its Co-Personal Representatives, Robert H. Covington and Mary C.
Whetman, Plaintiff, vs. John C. and Geraldine C. Josephson,
Defendants," Civil No. C-89-3339, entered in this action on or
about December 18, 1991, bars this action in its entirety.
WHEREFORE, defendants pray for judgment dismissing
plaintiffs1 Complaint, for costs, and for such other relief as is
just to be granted in the premises.

RDON A. MADSEN
ttorney for the Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Answer was mailed
to David K. Broadbent and Thomas M. Melton, attorneys for the
plaintiffs, at their address, 175 East Fourth South, #900, Salt
Lake City, Utah

84111, postage prepaid, this J$

August, 1992.
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-~- day of

EXHIBIT "A"
POBERT C. CUMKINGS, #777
Attorney for the Defendants
225 South 200 East, #150
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone 322-1141
6F
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE ESTATE OF DOUGLAS B.,
COVINGTON, by and through its
Cc-Personal Representatives,
Robert H. Covington and
Mary C. Whetman,
JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
Civil No. C-89-3339

vs.
JOHN C. and GERALDINE C.
JOSEPH SON,

Judge Richard B. Moffat

Defendants,
The above-entitled action came on for trial on the
19th day of June, 1991, before the Honorable Richard H. Moffat,
District Court Judge.

The plaintiffs appeared in person and

by and through their attorneys, David K. Broadbent and Sally
McKinimee, and the defendants appeared in person and by and
through their attorney, Robert C. Cummings.

The Court heard the

opening arguments cf counsel and the evidence presented during
plaintiffs1 case in cnief, and the parties stipulated with regard
to certain testimony as set forth in the record, and the parties
having further stipulated that the matter of attorneys fees be
reserved for determination after the trial.

The defendants made a

motion for nonsuit at the conclusion of the plaintiffs1 case in
chief, and the court determined that, based upon the facts and
law, the plaintiffs are not entitled to relief on their Complaint
and determined that defendants are entitled to the right-of-way as
hereinafter set forth, and the matter of attorney's fees having
been presented by affidavit and argument of counsel for the
parties conducted on October 25, 1991, and the Court, being
advised in the premises, and the Court, having heretofore made
and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED:
1.

The defendants and their heirs and assigns forever

are owners in fee simple of the following-described real property
in Salt Lake County, Utah:
Beginning at a point North 89° 541 10" West 1320 feet
from the Southeast Corner of Section 35, Township 2
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base & Meridian, running
thence North 0° 10' 23" West 505.475 feet to a point on
an old barbed wire fence line; thence North 86° 34' 10"
West along an existing fence line 265.41 feet; thence
South 20° 15'East 555.567 feet to the South line of said
Section 35; thence along said South line South 89° 54'
10" East 74.17 feet to the point of beginning.
Less the following-described tract:
Beginning at a point North 89° 54f 10" West 1374.47 feet
from the Southeast corner of Section 35, Township 2
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and
running thence North 89° 54' 10" West 10.88 feet; thence
North 20° 15' West 155.99 feet to the Southeast corner
of Lot 12, Scottish Heights No. 1-A; thence North 20°
15' West 317.95 feet to'the Northeast corner of Lot 10,
Scottish Heights No. 1-A; thence South 89° 42' 07" East
12.03 feet to fence line; thence South 19° 56' East
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along fence line 316,93 feet; thence South 20 p 30' East
along fence line 156.57 feet to the point of beginning.
Together with the following described tract:
Beginning at a point North 89° 54' 10" Wesr 1320.00 feet
from the Southeast corner of Section 35, Township 2
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and
running thence North 89° 54' 10" West 54.47 feet to
fence line; thence South 20° 30' East along fence line
6.41 feet to fence corner? thence South 89° 54' 10" East
along fence line 52.24 feet; thence North 0° 10* 23"
West 6.00 feet to the point of beginning.
Together with a non-exclusive right-of-way for ingress
to and egress from the aforesaid tracts described in this
paragraph 1 of this Judgment over the following-described tract:
Beginning at a point which is North 89° 54' 10" West 1320
feet and North 0° 10' 23" West 505.475 feet from the
Southeast corner of Section 35, Township 2 South, Range 1
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence North
86° 341 10" West along an existing fence line 125 feet, more
or less, to the west boundry of existing entrance way to
defendants' real property hereinabove described in this
paragraph 1 of this Judgment; thence North 0° 10' 23" West 15
feet; thence South 86° 34' 10" East 125 feet, more or less,
to the Fast boundry of plaintiffs' property described in
paragraph 3 below; thence South 0° 10' 23" East 15 feet to
the point of beginning.
If plaintiffs or their heirs or assigns forever elect to
maintain a locked gate across said right-of-way, a key
thereto will be furnished at all times by the party
maintaining said locked gate to defendants and their heirs,
and assigns forever.
2.

The defendants are owners of five (5) shares of Big

Willow Irrigation Company water stock, which have been delivered
to them.
3.

Plaintiffs and their heirs and assigns forever are

owners in fee simple of the following-described real property in
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Salt Lake County, Utah, subject only to the non-exclusive right-ofway referred to in paragraph 1 above:
Eeginninc at a point which is North 89° 54' 10" West
1320.00 feet ar.5 North 00s 10f 23" West 503.475 feet
from the Southeast Corner of Section 35, Township 2
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and
running thence North 86° 34* 10" West along an existing
fence line 265,41 feet; thence North 20° 15' 00M West
312.53 feet; thence South 89° 54' 19" East 372.18 feet;
thence South 00° 10' 23" East 308.48 feet to the point
of Beginning.
4.

The defendants are awarded attorney's fees in the

amount of $4,000.00, together with their costs of court of $74.00.
DATED this

1 £>

day of December, 1991.
BY THE COURT:

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

The foregoing Judgment
approved as to form:

DAVID H. EROADBENT
SALLEY McMINIMEE
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

F0B2r^C. CUMMINGS
Attorney for Defendants
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UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT
l. THIS AGREEMENT, made in duplicate this .

4tfr

-Mjtt

. day of _

1973

, A D . 19-

DOUGLAS B . COVINCTQN AND ALICE H. COVINGTON a k a ALICE HANSEN COVINGTON
by and between
hereinafter d e b a t e d a , the Seller, and
JOttN C , J O S * P H S O N A N D G F R A L D I N H C T J O S E P M S C t U
hia wife,

as j n t ten and not as ten in comnon, with f u l l

hereinafter designated as the Buyer, of

Salt

LakeCltV,

r i g h t s of

survivorshipp

Utah

2. W I T N E S S E T H : That the Seller, fur the consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey to the buyer, . j
and the buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase the fuilowing described real property, situate in
the county of .

.Sfllt l a k r

State of Utah, to-wit: .

I!
BBS .at a p o i n t N 8 9 ° 5 4 , 1 0 , t W 1320 f t f r th«? SE cor of Sec 3 5 , T2S,
R1E, SLB&M and runnino th N 0 ° 1 0 t 2 3 " W 505.475 f t t o a n o m t on an old barbed
w i r e f e n c c l i n e ; thence N 86°34«10" W 265.41 t t ; th S 20 D 15 • E 555 # 56? f t
|!|
t o t h ? £ l i n e of s a i d S e c 35; t h along s a i d S l i n e S a 9 o 5 4 , 1 0 n E 74.17 f t
to p o i n t of beg*
5
TOGETHER WITH X s h a r e s of Bdg Willow I r r i g a t i o n w a t e r s t o c k .

Moie particularly desenbed as follows:

;JI
i
i;

•Ijll

3. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into possession and pay for said described premises the sum of
S I C T ^ S N THOUSAND r i G H T HUNDRED T H I R T Y A N D N O / 1 0 0 - - - ~ Dollars ^ 6 , 8 3 0 ^ 0 0
payable at the office of Seller, his assigns or order .
strictly within the following times. W-w.t: T H 3 F S

DRAPER

}

THOUSAND W D N Q / 1 0 0

cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the balance of <

1

-.

*

(Hi

i!

BANK AMTl T R U S T
(

| 3,000„0Q

}

i|l

. shall be paid a* follows:

$107 # C0 or more per month commencing June 10, 1973 *nd monthly thereafter
until principal balance together with accrued interest has been paid in full.
Any payment that becomes 15 days or more delinquent shall be charged a $5»00 j
per month late charge.
«,
Mr. Covington shall retain use of bldgs on property for a period of 10 years,
if desired,
j,
Buyer agrees to not hold seller liable for any future problems or litigationj
with regard to boundary line discrepancy between survey and existing fence line
Seller agrees to assist buyer in any way possible to resolve problem.
Possession of said premises shall be delivered to buyer on the

4Ltu

day of

May

1973

ID

4. Said monthly payments arc to be applied first to the payment of interest and second to the reduction of the
principal. Interest shall be charged from

5—4—73

o n A||

unpaid portions of the

. .per cent (
flff,.
» r r ) per annum. The Buyer,
his option
at anytime, •' J
purchase price at the rate of
. . at
_...._
... .
_&\5L
may pay amounU in excess of the monthly payments upon the unpatd balance subject to the limitations of any mortgage
or contract by the Buyer herein assumed, such excess to be applied either to unpaid principal or in prepayment of future
installments at the election of the buyer, which election must be made at the time the excess payment is mude.
5. It is understood and agreed that if the Seller accepts payment from the Buyer on this contract less than according
to the terms herein mentioned, then by so doing, it will in no way alter the terms of the contract a* to the forfeiture
hereinafter stipulated, or as to any other remedies of the seller.
6. It is understood that there presently exists an obligation against said property in favor of

none

with an unpaid balance of
_, as of .

7. Seller represents that there are no unpaid special improvement district taxes covering improvements to said premu e s now in the process of being installed, or which have been completed and not paid for, outstanding against said property, except the following
nrrnp
8. The Seller is given the option to secure, execute and maintain loans secured by said property of not to exceed the
then unpaid contract balance hereunder, bearing interest at the rate of not to exceed

fi

percent

-rA ) per annum and payable in regular monthly installments; j
U
that the agrregate monthly installment
payments required to be made by Seller on said loans shall not be greater than each installment payment required to l «
made r>y the Buyer under this contract. When the principal due hereunder has been reduced to the amount of any such
loan* m d mortgages the Seller agrees to convey and the Buyer agrees to accept title to the above described property
subject to said loans and m trtgagea.
9. If the Buyer desire* to exercis* his right through accelerated paymenu under this agreement to pay off any obligations out funding at date of this agreement against said property, it shall be the J' Iyer's obligation to assume and
pay any penalty which may be required on prepayment of said prior ohltgutiuns. Prepayment penalties in respect
o obligations against said property incurred by seller, after date of this agreement, snail 'be paid by seller unless
aid wbligations are assumed or approved by buyer.
10 The Buyer agrees upon written request of the Seller to make application to a reliable lender for a loan of such
amount as can be secured under the regulations of said lender and hi r ' agrees to apply tiny amount so received upon
the purchase price above mentioned, and to execute the papers requu
. pay one-half the expenses necessary in obtaming
. loan, the Seller agreeing to pay the other one half, provided however, that the monthly p a y m e n u and
interest rate required, shall not exceed the monthly payments and interest rate as outlined above.
11. The ..« yer agrees to pay all taxes and assessments of every kind and nature which are or which may be assessed
and which may become due on these premises during the life of this agreement. The Seller hereby covenants and agrees
that there are no assessments against said premises except the following:

none
The Seller further covenants and agrees that he will not default in the payment of his obligations against said property.

"
I
)
i
!
;
j

i
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12. The Buyer arret* to pay the general taxes after .

13. The Buyer further agrees to keep a)) insurable buildings and improvement* on »aid premises insured in a company acceptable lo the Seller in the amount of not less than the unpaid balance on this contract, or $
TSL*.
and to assign said insurancr to the Seller as hit intereata may api*ar and to deliver the insurance policy to him.
J4 In the event the Buyer ahall default in thr payment of any s o c i a l or general taxes, assessment* or insurance
premium* as herein provided, thr Seller may, at his option, pay aaid taxes. assessment* and insurance premium* or cither
of thrni. and if Seller elect* so to do, then the fiuver agree* to repay lh«« Seller upon demand, all such aunt* ao advanced
and paid hy him, together with interest thereon from date of payment of aaid sums at the rate of ** of one percent per
month until paid.
15 Miner agrees that he will not commit or suffer to I* committed any waste, spoil, or destruction in or upon
said premises, and that he mill maintain aaid premiaea in pood condition.
JO In the event of a failure to comply with the terms hereof hy the Buyer, or upon failure of the Buyer to make
anv ptivmcut or payment* when the same ahall Income due, or within
30
days thereafter, the
Seller, at his option shall have the following alternative remediea:
A. Seller shall have the right, upon failure of the Buyer to renwdy the default within five days after written notire,
to he reloaded fmnt all obligations m lav. and in equiU to convey said property, and all 'payments which have
been made thereto/ore on this contract by the Huvei, ahall be forfeited to the Seller a« liquidated damage* for
the linn-performance of the contract, and tin- Buvrr agrees that thr Si-ller may a l his option re-enter and Uikc
possessi' it ol aaid prrmisi-s without leghl processes nt- tit MR first and Inrmei estate, together with all improvements and additions made bv the Ituver ttiereou. and the said additions and improvements ahall remain with
tin land become the property of th«- Sellei. the Huvrr hemming at once a tenant at will of the Seller; or
B. Tb< Seller may brine: suit and recover luarmeut for all delinquent iiMiallmcntfc. including cost* and attorney?
feet (The use of this remedy on one or mure occasions shall not prevent the Seller, at ins option, from resoiling
to one of the other remedies hcreund* r in the event of a subsequent default): or
C. The Sciier shall have the right, at his option, and upon w n t t e n notice to the Buyer, to declare the entire unpaid
balance hereunder al once due and payable, and may elect to treat this contract a^ a note and mortgage, and paas
title to the Hover subiect thereto, and proceed immediately to foreclose the anme in accordance with thr laws of
the State ot Utah, and have the property sold and the proceeds applied lo the payment of the balance owing,
including costs and attorney's feet;; and the Seller may have a judgment for any deficiency which mav remain.
In the case of foreclosure, the Seller hereunder, upon the filing of a complaint, shall be immediately entitled to
the appointment of a receiver to take possession of aaid mortgaged property and collect the rents, issues and
profits therefrom and apply the aame to the payment of the obturation hereunder, or hold thi aame pursuant
to order of the court; and the Seller, upon entry of judgment of foreclosure, ahall be entitled to the possession
of the said premises during the period of redemption.
37. It is agreed that time is the essence of this agreement.
IB. In the event there are any hens or encumbrances a pa mat said premises other than those herein provided for or
referred to. or in the event any liens or encumbrances other than herein provided for ahall hereafter accrue against the
aame by acts or neglect of the Seller, then the Buyer may, at his option, nay and discharge the aame and receive credit
on the amount then remainmp due hereunder in the amount of any such payment or payments and thereafter the pay.
ments herein provided to be made, may. at the option of the Buyer, be suspended until auch time as such suspended
puyments shall equal any sums advanced as aforesaid.
lf>. The Seller on receiving the payments herein reserved to be paid at the lime and in the manner above mentioned
atrreet to rxecute and deliver to the Buyer or assi/rns. a pood and auflicicnt warranty deed conveymp
the title lo the
above described premises free and clear of all encumbrances except as herein mentioned and except as may have accrued
by or through the acts or neglect of the Buyer, and to furnish at his expense, a policy of title insurance in the amount
of thr purchase price or at the option of the Seller, an abstract brought to date at time of sale or at any time during the
term of this agreement, or at time of delivery of deed, at the option of Buyer.
20. It is hereby expressly understood and agreed by the parties hereto that the Buyer accepts the said property
in its present condition and that there are no representations, covenants, or agreements between the parties heieto with
reference to said property except as herein specifically ael forth or attached hereto

none
21. The Buver and Seller each agree that should they default in any of the covenants or agreements contained herein, that the defaulting party shall pa> all costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise
or accrue from enforcing this agreement, or in obtaining possession of the premises covered hereby, or in pursuing any
remedy provided hereunder or by the statutes of the State ot Utah whether such remedy is pursued by filinp a suit
or otherwise.
22. It is understood that the stipulations aforesaid arc to apply to and bind the heirs, executors, administrators, successors, and assigns of the respective parties hereto.
TK
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Gordon A. Madsen
#2048
Attorney for Defendants
1130 West Center Street
North Salt Lake, Utah 84054
Telephone: (801) 298-6610
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT* OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT

THE ESTATE OF DOUGLAS B.
COVINGTON, by and through it's
Co-Personal Representatives,
Robert H. Covington and Mary
C. Wheaton,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFFSXMOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civile/No. 920009436CV

JOHN C. and GERALDINE C.
JOSEPHSON,

Jjrage: Robin W. Reese

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF DAVIS

)
)

ss,

JOHN C. JOSEPHSON, upon his oath deposes and says:
1.

That I am one of the Defendants named in the above-

entitled action, and aver the facts set out below from my own
direct knowledge.
2.

That I fully performed my duties under the Uniform

Real Estate Contract referred to in Plaintiffs' Complaint, making
the final payment May 18, 1989 as demonstrated by the attached
statement of Draper Bank, marked Exhibit

"A" and

incorporated

herein by reference as though set out in full.
3.

The Third District court in the case involving the

same Plaintiffs and Defendants, Civil No. C-89-3339, Judge Richard

H. Moffat, presiding, in its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of
Law,

stated at Finding #6.
"The Uniform
full."

Real Estate Contract has been paid

in

A copy of the court's Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law are
attached hereto, marked Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein by
reference as though set out in full.
4.

While those Findings and the Judgment attached to

Plaintiffs' Memorandum make it obvious, I further state that my
Answer

filed

in that

action

alleged

full performance

of

the

contract by me, and Plaintiffs' Reply denied such performance, and
that issue was directly tried by the District court, giving rise to
the above-quoted Finding.

Subscribed and sworn to Defore me, a Notary Public this
16th day of October, 1992.
1

J^Z"* ^"'"i>S.

1 y&^^z/^r
1

^^siy.ld*^
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STATE OF UTAH
My Cc:r.,Tission Expires
August 3,1996

1
1
1

KIMBERLY WRIGHT

1

U7North200West
SaftUke Cay, Utah 84103

1
|

^v&^jrf/O jtfhjtr
5TARY PUJ3LI
Residing at:

My commission expires:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Affidavit
to

David

K.

Broadbent

and

Thomas

M.

Melton,

attorneys

for

Plaintiffs, at their address, City Centre I, Suite 900, 175 East
Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this 16th day of October,

1992

^
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Buyer..

John C Josephson
8560 Danish Rd
Sandy, Utah 84092

*s n M r c K¥?a*£
cr

T

• u$

T

0»4»f«

8500 Danish Rd

UTAH

sandy, Utah—ff4tmr-

942-3338

13, 830.00

Contract Amount

Unpaid Balance.

Principal
& Interest

110,00

Payment.

Escrow .

8%

Interest

At

Buyer.

S/C

Date of Contract

Checking

Interest From

Savings

82-00748-5

5.00

105.00

At.

C/C
OTHER DISBURSEMENT:
days c h a r g e ' 5 . 0 0 l a t e

Seller

charge"

ACCOUNT NO..

ATE

PAYMENT

•9-87 460.00
•15-81 575.00
230.00
•11-8
) - l - 87
28-8

225.00
110.00

225.06
L-88
345.00
-88
5-88
225.00
1-88 230.00
455.00
27-881
2-89
220.00
3-89
97.79
i in f u l l

ESCROW

INTEREST
AMOUNT

79.19
86.75
28.40
25.72
11.53 _
21.82
28.77
15.15
12.42
19.32
2.02
1.90

PAID TO

2-10-87
7-10- 8
9-10-87

S/C

late
late

TAX&
INSURANCE

5.00
5.00

11-1011-87
12-10-8 ' late 5.00
Jt-10-88 late 5 L00
5-10-88
late
b.oo
7-10-88 late 5 00
9-10-88 late IP 00
9 late 15| 00

t!P_~i _

2-10-89
5-18-89

-r) ttcsJZsV-

10.00

losing fee

"b\

t I

MISC

PRINCIPAL

365.18
473.25
201.60
199.28
93.47
198.18
301.23
204.85
207.58
420.68
85.89

BALANCE

2603.99
2130.74
1929.14
1729.86
1636.39
1-38.21
1136.98
932.13
724.55
303.87
85,8

o?8o

ROBERT C. CUMMINGS, #777
Attorney for the Defendants
225 South 200 East, #150
Salt Lake City, Utah 64111
Telephone 322-1141
6F
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE ESTATE OF DOUGLAS B.,
COVINGTON, by and through its
Co-Personal Representatives,
Robert H. Covington and
Mary C. Whetman,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. C-89-3339

JOHN C. and GERALDINE C.
JOSEPHSON,

Judge Richard H. Moffat

Defendants.
The above-entitled action came on for trial on the
19th day of June, 1991, before the Honorable Richard H. Moffat,
District Court Judge.

The plaintiffs appeared in person and

by and through their attorneys, David K. Broadbent and Sally
McMinimee, and the defendants appeared in person and by and
through their attorney, Robert C. Cummings.

The Court heard the

opening arguments of counsel and the evidence presented during
plaintiffs' case in chief, and the parties stipulated with regard
to certain testimony as set forth in the record, and the parties
having further stipulated that tne matter of attorneys fees be
reserved for determination after the trial.

-/ ^JX>Ms&'7

The defendants made a

''£> "

motion for nonsuit at the conclusion of the plaintiffs' case in
chief, and the court determined that, based upon the facts and
law, the plaintiffs are not entitled to relief on their Complaint
and determined that defendants are entitled to the right-of-way as
hereinafter set forth, and the matter of attorney's fees having
been presented by affidavit and argument of counsel for the
parties conducted on October 25, 1991, and the Court, being
advised in the premises, now makes the following:
FINDINGS OP FACT:
1.
predecessors,

On or about April 6, 1973, the plaintiffs1
Douglas B* and Alice H. Covington, for a good and

valuable consideration executed and delivered to defendants an
Option, copy of which was entered into evidence at the trial as
Defendants' Exhibit 5.
2.

The last paragraph of the Option states:

"There will be an access R/W conveyed which is to be
described just south of Covington Drive Way."
3.

On May 4, 1973, plaintiffs' said predecessors,

Douglas B. Convington and his wife, Alice H. Covington, as
sellers, and the defendants, as buyers, entered into a Uniform
Real Estate Contract (Defendants' Exhibit 6), whereby sellers sold
to buyers, and buyers purchased from sellers, the followingdescribed tract of land in Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, U:ah:
Beginning at a point North 89° 54' 10" West 1320 feet
from the Southeast Corner of Section 35, Tow-snip 2
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base & Meridian, running

thence North 0° 10' 23" West 505.475 feet to a point on
an old barbed wire fenceline; thence North 86° 34' 10"
fcest 265.41 fee-; thence South 20° 15'East 555.567 feet
to the South line of ssid Section 35; thence along said
South line South 89° 54" 10" East 74.17 feet to the
point of beginning.
Together with 5 srares of Big Willow Irrigation Company
water stock.
4.

On May 4, 1973, and as a part of the same

transaction as that referred to in paragraph 3 above, plaintiffs1
predecessor, Douglas B. Covington, and defendant, John C.
Josephson, entered into a written Addendum to said Uniform Real
Estate Contract (Defendants' Exhibit 7) which provided as follows:
"With regard to the Uniform Real Estate contract by and
between Douglas Covington and Jon C. Josephson, a right
of way from Danish Road to the North side of the subject
property shall be added to the uniform real estate
contract when legal description is obtained."
5.

The Court finds that, by virtue of said Uniform

Real Estate Contract and said Addendum, the parties intended that
the defendants receive a non-exclusive right-of-way for ingress to
and egress from the tract referred to in paragraph 3 of these
Findings over a tract retained by the sellers (which tract is
described in paragraph 12 of these Findings) extending from Danish
Road and entering the tract being purchased by defendants through
an entrance-way on the North side of said tract being purchased by
defendants located between two small existing buildings, the West
boundary of which entrance-way is located 125 feet, more or less,
from the East boundary of said tracts.

--*-

6.

The Uniform Real Estate Contract has been paid in

7.

At the time of the aforesaid sale, Douglas B.

full.

Covington and Alice H. Covington owned the property as joint
tenants.

Douglas B. Covington died in 1987, and the said Alice H.

Covington predeceased him.
8.

After the aforesaid sale the said Douglas B.

Covington and Alice H. Covington, his wife, and the defendants
entered into an exchange of property with Thomas F. English and
Carene S. English, his wife, resulting in minor modifications to
the tract sold to the defendants as aforesaid and which exchange
is not in dispute in this action.

Said changes are reflected in

the legal description set out in paragraph 9 of these Findings.
9. The defendants and their heirs and assigns forever
are the owners in fee simple of, and entitled to possession of,
the following-described real property in Salt Lake County, Utah,
to-wit:
Beginning at a point North 89° 54f 10" West 1320 feet
from the Southeast Corner of Section 35, Township 2
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base & Meridian, running
thence North 0° 10f 23" West 505*475 feet to a point on
an old barbed wire fence line; thence North 86° 34* 10"
West along an existing fence line 265.41 feet; tr -nee
South "20u IS1Past 555.567 feetto the South line of said
Secticn 35; thence along said South line South 89° 54'
10" East 74.17 feet to the point of beginning.
Less the following-described tract:
Beginning at a point North 89° 54' 10" West 1374.47 feet
from the Southeast corner of Section 35, Township 2
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and
running thence North 89* 54' 10" West 10.88 feet; thence

North 20° 15' West 155.99 feet to the Southeast corner
of Lot 12, Scottish Heights No. 1-A; thence North 20°
15' Wes- 317.95 feet to the Northeast corner of Lot 10,
Scottish Heights No. 1-A; thence South 89° 42' 07" East
12.03 feet to fence line; thence South 19° 56f East
along fence line 315.93 feet; thence South 20° 30f East
along fence line 156.57 feet to the point of beginning.
Together with the following described tract:
Beginning at a point North 89° 54' 10" West 1320.00 feet
from the Southeast corner of Section 35, Township 2
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and
running thence North 89° 54' 10" West 54.47 feet to
fence line; thence South 20° 30' East along fence line
6.41 feet to fence corner; thence South 89° 54' 10" East
along fence line 52.24 feet; thence North 0° 10' 23"
West 6.00 feet to the point of beginning.
Together with a non-exclusive right-of-way for ingress to
and egress from the aforesaid tracts^ over the property retained by
plaintiffs1 predecessors, which is now owned by plaintiffs and
which is described in paragraph 12 of these Findings.
10.

With respect to the location of the said non-

exclusive right-of-way, the parties have stipulated that the said
non-exclusive right-of-way referred to in the preceding paragraph
9 shall be located as follows:
Beginning at a point which is North 89° 54' 10" West 1320
feet and North 0° 10• 23" West 505.475 feet from the
Southeast corner of Section 35, Township 2 South, Range 1
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence North
86° 34' 10" West alone r>~ ^v^^i*^ *anro i i nP 125 feet, more
or less, to the west bcuncry cf existing entrance way to
defendants' property described in paragraph 9 above; thence
North 0° 10'* 23" West 15 feet; thence South 86° 34' 10" East
125 feet, more or less, to the East bcundry of plaintiffs'
property described in paragraph 12 below; thence South 0° 10f
23" East 15 feet to the point of beginning.
If plaintiffs or their heirs or assigns forever elect to
maintain a locked gate across said right-of-way, a key
thereto will be furnished at all times by the party

-5-

maintaining said locked gate to defendants and their
heirs and assigns forever.
11.

The defendants are owners of five shares of The

Big Willow Irrigation Company water stock, which shares have been
delivered to them.
12.

Plaintiffs and their heirs and assigns forever are

the owners in fee simple of, and entitled to possession of, the
following-described real property, subject only to the right-ofway referred to in paragraph 10 above:
Beginning at a point which is North 89° 54' 10" West
1320.00 feet and North 00° 10* 23" West 505.475 feet
from the Southeast Corner of Section 35, Township 2
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and
running thence North 86° 34' 10" West along an fisting
fA n r^ linp 265.41 feet; thence North 20° 15' 00" West
312.53 feet; thence South 89° 54' 19" East 372.18 feet;
thence South 00° 10• 23" East 308.48 feet to the point
of Beginning.
13.

It is reasonable that the defendants be awarded

attorney's fees incurred by them in connection with this
proceeding in the sum of $4,000.00, together with their costs
of court in the sum of $74.00.,
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes
and enters the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
1-

The defendants are entitled to the judgment and

decree of this court adjudging that they are owners in fee simple
absolute of the real property described in paragraph 9 of the
foreaoing Findings of Fact, free and clear of any claim of the
plaintiffs.

-6-

2.

The defendants are entitled to judgment and decree

cf this cc^rt adjudging that they have a non-exclusive right-ofway described in paragraph 10 of the Findings cf Fact for ingress
to and egress from said tract across the property retained by the
plaintiffs and which is described in paragraph 12 of the Findings
of Fact.
3.

The defendants are entitled to judgment in the sum

of $4,000.00 attorney's fees and their costs of court of $74-00.
DATED this

ifo

day of December, 1991.
BY THE COURT:

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

The foregoing Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law
Approved as to form:

DAVID H. BROADBENT
SALLEY McMINIMEE
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

ill

{$ fat

R O B E R T C. C U M M I N G S
Attorney «t LAW
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2 2 5 SOUTH SECOND EAST
SAX.TLAKE CITY, UTAH 04111
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TELEPHONE

June 22, 1992

<eoi)322-H4i

Ms. Sally McMinimee
Mr. David Broadbent
Attorneys at Law
175 East 4th South #900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
RE:

Mr. John Josephson

Dear Sally and David:
I spoke with John and told him that the figures on the taxes were
coming. I also forwarded to him Daye^s letter outlining the
amounts, but I find that John is/$ur'of town for a few weeks. I
will make contact as soon as I can and get back to you.
Thank you.

Very t r u l ^

tfours,

ROBERTV/C. CUMMINGS
3a
6F

/POJ

PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
David K. Broadbent (0442)
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 524-1000
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

The Estate of DOUGLAS B.
COVINGTON, by and through its
Co-Personal Representatives,
Robert H. Covington and
Mary C. Whetman,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
Civil NO./920009436CV

vs.
JOHN C. and GERALDINE C.
JOSEPHSON,

Judge/Robin W. Reese

Defendants.

Plaintiff's and Defendants' cross-motions for summary
judgment came before the Court on January 4, 1993.

Based upon

its review of the memoranda and affidavits submitted by the
parties and arguments of counsel, and the Court finding that
there are no genuine issues of fact,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

The plaintiffs' claims are not barred by the

doctrine of res judicata.

2.

Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is hereby

granted, and defendants' motion is denied.
3.

Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the

defendants, John C. and Geraldine Josephson, in the amount of
$3,370.70, together with costs in the amount of $ i 1> t ^'' }
attorneys fees in the amount of $ 1 (Z7 > ^

and

, and interest on

the sum of $3,440.70 at the contract rate of 3/4 of one percent
per month from May 8, 1992 until the date hereof, and interest on
the total judgment at the statutory judgment rate of twelve
percent per annum thereafter until paid.
4.

The judgment shall be augmented in the amount of

reasonable costs and attorneys' fees expended in collecting said
judgment by execution or otherwise as shall be established by
affidavit.
DATED this

II

day of J**wa€ery, 1993.

BY THE eomrzt
i •

hrf t , _ , r

„

m

ROBIN W. REESE
Circuit Court Judge
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